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Introduction
Weprovide seven responses to Kovacs and Conway’s wide-ranging
theory of intelligence differences. In the first six, we: reflect on the
past theories that can be heard in this new one and how they have
fared; discuss whether, in their present state, cognitive processes
inferred frommental tests can be considered isomorphic with brain
processes and can bear explanatory weight in theories of intelli-
gence; and suggest that the positive manifold might be a formative
biological latent trait while probably being a reflective psychological
one. In the seventh, we attempt to test some hypotheses from Pro-
cess Overlap Theory in our own Lothian Birth Cohort 1936 data.
Process Overlap Theory as a Palimpsest
Knowing the history of the many attempts to explain the posi-
tive correlations between mental tests almost hinders the
assessment of this one. We kept seeing the ghosts of past theo-
ries in and between the lines of the writing. One of us has
recently reexplained and reexamined (and recompared with
others’ theories) Godfrey Thomson’s “bonds/sampling” theory
of intelligence—to which Kristof Kovacs and Andrew Conway
(this issue) concede they owe a debt—and we see strong simi-
larities (Bartholomew, Allerhand, & Deary, 2013; Bartholomew,
Deary, & Lawn, 2009). Well, yes and no: The account that
Kovacs and Conway (this issue) give is more like Thomson’s
(1916) initial dice-throwing idea and is less informed by the
later (e.g., Thomson, 1939) sampling/bonds theory, which did
not propose a small number of separate processes, instead pos-
iting a huge number of neural/cognitive entities that are sam-
pled by different tests: “Instead of showing that the mind has a
definite structure, being composed of a few factors which work
through innumerable specific machines, the low rank shows
that the mind has hardly any structure” (Thomson, 1939, p.
270).
However, we should also be fair to Kovacs and Conway,
and state that Thomson’s various writings can be perused
to get a slightly different reading of the brain substrate for
his theory, one that sounds similar to the Carroll–Horn–
Cattell hierarchy (Carroll, 1993). At a 1939 symposium at
which Spearman and Burt were also speaking, Thomson
summed up as follows:
I myself lean at the moment more towards Spearman’s g and his
later group factors than I do to Thurstone’s, since they seem to me
more in accord with the ideas of my own Sampling Theory. On that
theory g is as it were the whole mind, and the tests are part of g, not
g part of the tests. And were that mind entirely undifferentiated,
structureless, g would be the only factor needed. As the complexity
of the mind, and the complexity of the upper brain, is organized
(partly by the maturing of hereditary bonds, mainly I fancy by edu-
cation and life) and integrated into “pools”, “clusters”, call them
what you will, so additional factors, additional descriptive coeffi-
cients, are needed. (Thomson, 1939/1940, p. 106)
We agree that, based on current evidence, one cannot now
choose between Spearman’s and Thomson’s ideas either statis-
tically or biologically (Bartholomew et al., 2009). However, two
things about Thomson’s ideas were not, but should be, recog-
nized by Kovacs and Conway. First, with Cyril Burt, we agree
that Thomson’s mature theory might have been a different way
of stating Spearman’s theory:
… (to put it crudely) a homogenous brain, consisting merely of a
very large number of similar nerve cells, identical in nature and in
strength, would obviously be a brain governed by a single general
factor. In short, there is no mathematical difference between assum-
ing only a single factor, varying continuously, and assuming an infi-
nite (or indefinitely large) number of unit factors forming a single
homogeneous “pool”. A bushel of wheat is still a bushel, whether
we call it corn or insist that it is composed of innumerable grains.
(Burt, 1940, p. 160)
Second, Thomson made clear that his theory tried to make
the explanatory construct an aspect(s) of the brain, whereas he
saw that g was an aspect of the tests (which brings us on, later,
to mental test-brain structure/function isomorphism):
The difference in point of view between the sampling theory and
the two-factor theory [of Spearman] is that the latter looks upon g
as being part of the test, while the former looks upon the test as
being part of g. The two-factor theory is therefore compelled to pos-
tulate specific factors to account for the remainder of the variance of
the test, and has to go on to offer some suggestions as to what spe-
cific factors are—perhaps, neural engines [Cf Anderson, 1992]. The
sampling theory simply says that the test requires only such and
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such a fraction of the bonds of the whole mind—the same fraction
which, on the two-factor theory, g forms of the variance of the test.
(Thomson, 1939, pp. 281–282)
Given that Thomson is often recounted by many as Spear-
man’s longest serving opponent of g, we should remind readers
that he did not think that g was incorrect, only that it was, he
judged, one among other possible explanations for the positive
correlations among mental tests. He saw it as his duty to think
of other possible accounts. However, he left it to the last para-
graph of his long obituary of Spearman, that is, after Spearman
could have heard him say it, to conclude, “Probably there is a
general factor of intelligence” (Thomson, 1947, p. 382).
Can Cognitive Processes Bear Explanatory Weight?
One of us has already dealt with this issue at length in a book
(Deary, 2000) that was devoted to assessing reductionist
accounts of human intelligence differences. The levels of reduc-
tion considered were cognitive process accounts, accounts
based on varieties of reaction time procedures, psychophysical
accounts, and brain biology and genetics. The various cognitive
process accounts were found to be unsatisfactory, because they
did not reduce or explain:
The nagging worry is that this area of research, frequently employ-
ing sophisticated modelling procedures, has done little more than
neatly and attractively pull apart the layers of the psychometric
layer cake. The slices can all be pushed together to reconstruct the
cake, but they have not, in truth, revealed what we wanted: the
ingredients and procedures of the recipes for different sponges and
fillings. As Stauffer, Ree, and Carretta (1996, p. 193) commented,
“Despite theoretical foundations and arguments, cognitive compo-
nents tests appear to measure much the same thing as traditional
paper-and-pencil tests.” (Deary, 2000, p. 144)
We apologize for the extended MacArthur Park cake meta-
phor, but the point is that truly explanatory, reductionist sci-
ence does not merely redescribe phenomena; rather, one needs
lower level, validated concepts from which to build correspond-
ences. We judge that psychology—including cognitive psychol-
ogy and psychophysics—when not rooted in validated brain
mechanisms has largely failed in this regard. Just as we criticize
any psychometric intelligence researchers who imagine their
hierarchical structural equation models that show patterns of
cognitive covariance can actually tell them how the brain is
fashioned, we still challenge cognitive psychologists to show a
brain account (a mechanistic molecular account, not just corre-
lations with, for example, brain imaging variables) of differen-
ces in a complex cognitive test that rises above na€ıve
isomorphism, that is, claiming a distinct brain process can be
seen in their atom-splitting of a mental test. We think we’ll
have to be patient in waiting for an account of why mental tests
covary, because we understand too little as yet about which
brain variables underlie cognitive differences.
So, to put together our first two points—that others have
mostly been this way before, and that cognitive processes are
rarely validated entities that can do explanatory work (they are
“skyhooks” and not “cranes,” according to Dennett’s, 1995,
typology)—and apply them to Kovacs and Conway’s pithiest
statement of their theory as follows (with our responses in
brackets):
The briefest possible summary of its central assumption is that any
test item or cognitive task requires a number of domain-specific as
well as domain-general cognitive processes [Spearman, Thomson,
and Anderson, 1992, among others, said this sort of thing]. The
domain-general processes that are central to performance on cogni-
tive tests are primarily the ones that are identified as executive pro-
cesses in cognitive psychology in general and the working memory
literature in particular [So-called executive processes and working
memory have been found empirically to be almost exact redescrip-
tions of g and come from the sorts of mental tests that produce g;
Diamond, 2013, said, in his Figure 4, that for two of the three higher
level executive functions—reasoning and problem solving—“fluid
intelligence is completely synonymous with these”; and Kyllonen
and Christal, 1990, showed near-identity—between working mem-
ory and reasoning]. Such processes are recruited by a large number
of test items, alongside domain-specific processes, which are tapped
by items appearing in specific types of tests only. In turn, domain-
general executive processes overlap with domain-specific processes
more than the domain-specific processes overlap with one another.
[These sound similar to Thomson’s “pools”/“clusters” of bonds.]
Thus, the pattern of thinking here is a Spearman–Thomson–
Anderson (1992) hybrid (pushing psychometric correlations
around in an explanatory kaleidoscope), and we doubt the
validity of the explanatory variable(s).
A Psychological “Grab Bag”
The Kovacs and Conway (this issue) article is to some extent a
“grab bag” that includes both core content and some items that
we think are of less quality and importance in the field of intel-
ligence differences. It is our judgement call that the differentia-
tion effect and the worst performance rule are, if they actually
exist, relatively small-scale phenomena that are not particularly
important for a general theory of intelligence to explain. One
of us has also previously examined Duncan’s goal neglect task
and the kernel component that was supposed to account for g
variance (Deary, 2000, pp. 136–140); the analysis found its con-
struct validity wanting, although the correlations with the task
were interesting. Another phenomenon brought to bear is the
close correlation between fluid intelligence (Gf) and g; we do
not agree that this is a cause for concern in the way that the
authors do, and we have concerns about their psychometric
argument to segregate them. This is based upon apparently dif-
ferent correlations between working memory and Gf (r D .85)
and g (r D .48). However, the former statistic (Oberauer,
Schulze, Wilhelm, & S€uss, 2005) was based on a reanalysis of
the same data as the latter (Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005).
The difference was that Ackerman et al. (2005) opted to fix
their manifest-to-latent loadings based on a previous model.
The correlation between g (measured the same way in both
publications) was substantially increased when these paths were
not fixed (Oberauer et al., 2005). We deal with the further
efforts to separate g and Gf in the empirical section of this
commentary. In contrast, the crystallized–fluid intelligence divi-
sion is a useful one, particularly for describing ageing effects.
We see fluid intelligence being brain-as-knowledge-making-
machine, using external or internal stimuli to operate on and
crank out new stuff, and crystallized intelligence being brain-
as-knowledge-warehouse, manifested when we bring already-
stored items of knowledge to our or others’ consciousness.
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Other Causes of g Variance
Kovacs and Conway (this issue) recognize that, across the
human brain, the connecting white matter shows a latent factor
whereby some people’s connections tend generally to be health-
ier than others’ and that this accounts for about 10% of the var-
iance in the general factor extracted from multiple cognitive
tests (Penke et al., 2012). So, they conclude, it might be that
some general brain variance underlies most mental tasks, put-
ting a limit on performance. We commend their pluralism
here, in thinking that there might be some sources of general
brain variance (they call it z) in addition to their favored cogni-
tive processes in explaining the positive manifold. However,
they never say precisely how much variance in g they predict to
be explained by process overlap as compared to other sources
of variance (like brain integrity or mutualism). The 10% figure
comes from only one relevant brain measure; one of our recent
publications ups the number to 20% with the addition of multi-
ple other g-related measures of brain integrity, at least in older
age (Ritchie et al., 2015). In the future, more advanced tools
will probably increase the variance explained even further. If
this proportion of explained variance rises markedly, will
Kovacs and Conway still see room for cognitive processes as
formative contributors to explaining the positive manifold?
We see no reason why the biological contributions to g
should be reflective; rather, g could be characterized as the for-
mative result of multiple (sometimes uncorrelated) aspects of
biological makeup. This leaves open the possibility that g is a
formative construct at the biological level and a reflective con-
struct at the psychometric level. Vernon and Weese (1993)
noted such a prospect with reference even to multiple uncorre-
lated (rotated) aspects of information processing contributing
to g though, again, we would question the reductionist validity
of these variables. We provide a small-scale empirical demon-
stration of this “formative biology of g” idea below.
We should state that we have doubts as to whether there is a
level of explanatory constructs, at the cognitive level, that lies
between g and specific test variance and “form” g, “results with
tasks that are indeed elementary, and supposedly tap a small num-
ber of cognitive processes, show that g reflects a number of inde-
pendent sources” (Kovacs & Conway, this issue, p. 162). As far as
we see, performances on so-called elementary (they never are!) cog-
nitive tests are reflections of, rather than formative of, g (see
Luciano et al., 2005, and Plomin & Spinath, 2002, Figure 3, for dis-
cussion of this at the genetic level). Also, we judge that a set of bio-
logical (which of course includes environmental) formative
variables that contribute to g—that is, a more or less efficient
brain—is a more likely and tractable hypothesis than a set of psy-
chological skyhooks, as Kovacs and Conway suggest when they
argue that “tests indeed reflect specific abilities, which do have
ontological reality [Really?!]” (p. 162).
We think it is likely that, at the biological level, there will be
some contributors to domain-level andmore specific cognitive per-
formance, as well as to general cognitive ability. Insofar as Kovacs
and Conway agree with this, it is a restatement of Anderson’s
(1992) theory of intelligence differences. He envisaged a “basic
processing mechanism” on which all cognitive tests were imple-
mented, which had individual differences, and which therefore
contributed variance to differences in all cognitive tests. He also
thought there were “specific processors” that dealt with types of
mental problems (he mentions, e.g., spatial and verbal) and that
showed individual differences that might be uncorrelated with
each other and with the basic processing mechanism. In retro
terms, Anderson’s ideas might be translated into a cassette player
(the basic processing mechanism on which all one’s tapes are
played and that is more or less hi- or lo-fidelity) and one’s collec-
tion of cassette tapes (the specific processors that will have to bear
the limitations of the cassette player in order to be heard, and that
have their own quality variance, which has aspects not shared by
other tapes). That set of ideas—of there being mostly general brain
limitations, and some limitations that affect only specific types of
test—accords quite well with models by Spearman (1904, 1927)
and data collected from then onward.
So, when Kovacs and Conway (this issue) write, “Even if
someone were, in theory, capable of successful performance on
the domain-specific aspect of a mental test item, he or she
might be unable to arrive at a correct answer because of failing
to meet its executive attention demands” (p. 162), these are the
limitations modelled by Anderson (1992; i.e., that a perfectly
serviceable cassette tape cannot be heard on a damaged cassette
player) and can sit on a “basic processing mechanism” that is a
psychometric reflective g formed by partly uncorrelated biolog-
ical influences (i.e. a generally more or less efficient brain).
With reference to the item response theory equation, we think
that the pattern of errors they strive to explain with a cognitive
process model can be accounted for in part by biological influ-
ences on specific domains of cognitive functioning, influences
that are additional to any effect they have on g (see below).
Generally, we think there is some na€ıve cognitive process–
brain structure/function isomorphism in the target article. For
example, Kovacs and Conway (this issue) state that “test devel-
opers devote a lot of time and effort to constructing unidimen-
sional measures, tests that purportedly tap a single ability only”
(p. 165). But do they—and do the test developers—really think
we know the abilities, in terms of processes in the brain, that
are tapped by these tests? We can describe test similarities, but
we are wise to be agnostic about what stimulus-mincing and
computing goes on in the head to solve them. Some of the
material in the piece that appears to suggest that one can divine
the brain’s functional lineaments from what we can rationally
think about a mental test’s contents recapitulates the dry
Casaubonian scholarship of, for example, Carpenter, Just, and
Shell (1990) on Raven’s matrices (see the critique by Deary,
2000). We think one must understand the processing structure
and limitations of the brain and then join that to mental test
performance; mental test performance will tell us only so
much—perhaps not much—about what the brain does and
how. Translated to the kidney, in the study of cognitive differ-
ences we are still admiring and classifying the variety of colors
in our urine while we await the discovery of the nephron.
The Mysterious Figure 8
We stared at Kovacs and Conway’s (this issue) key Figure 8—
their core astrological chart purporting to explain why some
people are cleverer than others—for ages, trying to work out
what it stated explicitly and how to test that. If, we thought, we
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could crack the code of this mandala, we might find a make-or-
break hypothesis in the article. Our plight was not helped by
the fact that the relevant section of the article— titled “Process
Overlap Theory”—stops short of clearly elucidating the overlap
of the cognitive processes at the domain level of their hierarchy
in Figure 8. Instead, executive functions are shown as a constel-
lation of indistinguishable black dots. The degree to which one
dot equates to another across domains remains opaque. There
are tantalizing hints in the text (such as the idea that cognitive
inhibition is required across number series items, verbal analo-
gies and matrix reasoning), yet the missed opportunity to ren-
der this, and other such specifics, more clearly diminishes
opportunities to create a testable, falsifiable theory. We confess
we feel as if we might not fully have unpicked and understood
Figure 8 and its accompanying text, and we should like to have
grilled the authors on it; we do not rule out that we could have
missed some key ideas.
Big Theory, Small Data
Intelligence research, as one of us has previously argued, has a
plethora of flashy and eye-catching “big theories” that, ulti-
mately, have not been productive:
Like trying to decorate a house while a hyperactive toddler runs
around messing things up and forcing one to do trivial tidying
instead of long-term renovation, a theory can keep one busy refut-
ing or operationalising its aspects instead of focussing on less
immediately compelling, but fundamentally more important, sensi-
ble empirical advances.… Big theories divert people from the avail-
able empirical evidence and get them arguing instead about the
evidence can be forced into their scheme. (Deary, 2000,
pp. 108–109)
We data-gathering wallflowers can therefore appear grumpy
and jealous, as we follow our hair-shirt credos that, first, gather-
ing relevant and preferably large amounts of data from both
brain and behavior and creatively understanding their associa-
tions is likely to be helpful and, second, recognizing and admit-
ting that the tools and concepts are probably not in place yet to
truly understand intelligence differences. More evidence-based
intelligence research is required. We admit that this, though
perhaps correct, is rather boring:
At the risk of appearing unutterably dull, and to compound the fel-
ony of being against fanciful theory, one has to urge more replicated
studies, more inter-laboratory agreements on the operationalisation
of constructs and parameters to be measured, and generally larger
masses of data on the same topic so that one may hypothesise from
solid ground. To listen to discussions within the intelligence com-
munity is sometimes like watching an archaeologist who has dug a
trench one foot square and is speculating from that rather than wid-
ening the trench. (Deary, 2000, p. 110)
To be clear, the problem is not with the constructing of a theory
per se, it is the distance between the theory and the relevant data.
To understand cognitive differences and how variance in them is
parsed in the brain, one needs enough good cognitive and brain
data, and sufficient isomorphism between them. We have types of
mental tests—for which some are “desperately seeking a mental
cytology” (Deary, 2000, p. 88)—and a good idea about how they
covary, and models that arrange and display that covariance. We
don’t have the mechanistic brain constructs to which we can map
these packets of covariance beyond relatively gross measures (such
as those of brain macrostructure, blood oxygenation, and neuro-
anatomy, which provide only indirect—though valuable—intima-
tions of the true neurobiological nature of cognitive processes; e.g.
Zald, 2007). Identifying the existence of a cognitive process using
psychometric properties alone does not necessarily correspond to
the way in which the human brain gives rise to the behavioral phe-
nomenon beingmeasured.
Metaphorizing again, the effort to understand the psychobiol-
ogy of intelligence has a resemblance with digging the tunnel
between England and France:We hope, with workers on both sides
having a good sense of direction, that we canmeet andmarry brain
biology and cognitive differences. To date, though many have used
them to begin the biology-side-digging, we have to admit that vari-
ables like brain size and white matter “integrity,” though they have
produced interesting and replicable correlations with intelligence,
are not close to the sort of mechanistic understanding a true reduc-
tionist desires. However, it is (using Dennett’s, 1995, concepts
again) at least some progress using “cranes” rather than psychologi-
cal process “skyhooks.”
Some Empirical Tests
Consistent with our role as biology-side tunnelers, our task to
provide commentary would be incomplete without putting our
backs into some empirical testing of several points arising from
the target article. We address two specific predictions gleaned
from the Kovacs and Conway article, followed by a more gen-
eral point: (a) the strength of the positive manifold varies as a
function of frontal lobe atrophy; (b) g cannot be localized,
whereas Gf can; and (c) the formative biology of g. We test
each of these using cognitive, genetic, and brain-imaging data
from the second wave of the Lothian Birth Cohort 1936 (for
which details can be obtained from Deary et al., 2007; Deary,
Gow, Pattie, & Starr, 2012; Wardlaw et al., 2011). Although we
are still unclear as to whether the following are genuinely
unique predictions of process overlap theory, one of the bene-
fits of “big theory” is that it raises several points that one can
empirically test.
Domain-Generality of the Positive Manifold and Frontal
Lobe Atrophy
In their final paragraph, Kovacs and Conway (this issue)
describe a number of predictions made by process overlap the-
ory. One is that
process overlap theory predicts that age patterns of the maturation
as well as aging of the prefrontal cortex and thus of executive pro-
cesses should determine the domain-generality of the positive man-
ifold. However, this prediction might be difficult to test, because
different executive processes show very different developmental
and ageing patterns, and there is a large individual variation the
maturation and aging process itself. (p. 172)
We take this to mean that the positive manifold of intelligence
should become stronger as a function of greater prefrontal atrophy
(the structural integrity of which is central to executive processes).
An adequate test of this must also address the additional two cav-
eats provided by Kovacs and Conway (this issue). First, executive
processes show different ageing patterns. One plausible reason for
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reports of heterochronicity in the ageing of executive functionsmay
be because not all executive processes are equally supported by the
frontal cortex (Andres, Guerrini, Phillips, & Perfect, 2008), nor do
all such functions necessarily receive equal support from precisely
the same frontal subregions (Kievit et al., 2014; MacPherson, Della
Sala, Cox, Girardi, & Iveson, 2015). Comparative differences in
executive test reliabilities and/or the psychometric treatment of
memory and fluid variables may also partly drive their observed
differential age effects (Johnson, Logie, & Brockmole, 2010; Kievit
et al., 2014). Kovacs and Conway are consistent in their attribution
of executive processes to the frontal lobes in general, and particu-
larly with respect to Gf and Gv (their Figure 8). Thus, one could
infer that a measure of prefrontal atrophy would more strongly
index the age effects on those executive processesmore heavily sup-
ported by this region. In their second caveat, they rightly acknowl-
edge that the link between chronological age and biological aging
varies from person to person. Fortuitously, the sample in which we
test the prediction, the Lothian BirthCohort 1936, has an extremely
narrow age range (all were born in 1936), minimizing this concern.
In this sample of 681 participants with useable MRI data at a
mean age of 72.64 years (SD D 0.72), we used Freesurfer v.5.3
(http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/) and the Desikan-Killiany
atlas (Desikan et al., 2006) to derive a measure of each partici-
pant’s frontal lobe volume (summing the volumes of the fol-
lowing regions: superior frontal, middle frontal, rostral middle
frontal, middle orbitofrontal, lateral orbitofrontal, frontal pole,
rostral and caudal anterior cingulate and the inferior frontal
pars opercularis, pars triangularis and pars orbitalis). We cor-
rected the measure for intracranial volume (maximum healthy
brain size in younger adulthood) to produce a proxy measure
of frontal lobe atrophy.
We then used a moderated confirmatory factor analysis
model (Tucker-Drob, 2009) to calculate the extent of (de)differ-
entiation of cognitive abilities—indexed by a varied battery of
thirteen tests, organized into four domains as previously
described by Tucker-Drob, Briley, Starr, and Deary (2014), and
corrected for age and sex—according to the extent of frontal
atrophy. We found a result that was, to an extent, in line with
the prediction of process overlap theory: The estimated factor
communality (the % of the total variance across the cognitive
tests explained by the factor) was 23.6% higher in individuals
with the greatest rates of atrophy than in those with the least
atrophy (52.7% vs. 29.1%). However, the wide confidence inter-
val on the estimate, as shown in Figure 1, means that this com-
munality difference was not statistically significant.
As previously noted, we are not certain whether this predic-
tion is specific to process overlap theory. We would expect indi-
viduals with more atrophy, and thus smaller frontal lobes, to
have lower intelligence. Thus, the prediction can be seen as
simply a restatement of the idea of ability differentiation. If this
is so, it is certainly not a new prediction. Nevertheless, we pro-
vide the result here for further discussion.
Localization of g and Gf in the Brain
Kovacs and Conway (this issue) make the following statement
in their section “Overlapping Networks in the Brain”: “…even
though [Gf] is statistically identical to g, imaging studies dem-
onstrate their dissociability; whereas g cannot be localized, Gf is
linked to the prefrontal (primarily dorsolateral) and partly to
the (primarily posterior) parietal cortex with remarkable con-
sistency” (p. 167). The strong claim that g cannot be localized,
whereas Gf can, in spite of their statistical near-unity, is to
ignore the raft of potential cross-study differences, low sample
sizes, and imaging modality limitations, as well as some studies
that do identify neural correlates of g in the very areas Kovacs
and Conway assert are the exclusive preserve of Gf (reviewed
in, e.g., Colom & Thompson, 2011). Moreover, the claim that
studies “demonstrate their dissociability” would require at least
one study to have directly compared the neural correlates of g
and Gf within the same sample, finding the former to be absent
and/or nonoverlapping with the latter. Because we are not
aware of any such study, we attempted one here.
Kovacs and Conway argue that current brain research
reports neural correlates of g are so diverse that consistent
localization is prohibited, in contrast to the correlates of Gf,
which include mainly dorsolateral prefrontal and parietal corti-
ces. A direct test of the contention that g and Gf are neuroana-
tomically dissociable requires an adequately powered study in
which these two factor scores could be created in the same pop-
ulation using appropriate, but nonoverlapping, cognitive tests,
and on whom brain MRI data are available. To this end, we
(again using data from the Lothian Birth Cohort 1936) exam-
ined the subregional volume and surface area correlates of g
and Gf across the frontal and parietal lobes. To construct g, we
used Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–III Digit-Symbol Sub-
stitution, a test of Choice Reaction Time, Wechsler Memory
Scale–III Verbal Paired Associates, the National Adult Reading
Test, and Verbal Fluency (see Deary et al., 2007, for all referen-
ces and descriptions). To construct Gf, we used Matrix
Figure 1. Test of prefrontal differentiation. Note. Shaded area around the mean
communality line is the 95% confidence interval. The x-axis is in standard deviation
units.
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Reasoning, Block Design, Letter-Number Sequencing (from the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–III) and Spatial Span (from
the Wechsler Memory Scale–III). We estimated factor scores
from a confirmatory factor model of both latent variables. We
corrected both the MRI and cognitive measures for age and
sex. The results are displayed in Tables 1 and 2. As mentioned
by Kovacs and Conway, g and Gf were near-perfectly correlated
(rD .98), but their cerebral correlates did not behave as the the-
ory would predict. Not only were some regions associated with
g (consistently left dorsolateral, left rostral cingulate, and bilat-
eral parietal), but the magnitude of associations for all subre-
gions for g and Gf were near-identical (vector correlation for
surface area, r D .98, and for volume, r D .99). These data pro-
vide clear evidence that g and Gf are virtually identical in terms
of bivariate associations, and with respect to their cortical
correlates.
Formative Biology, Reflective g
To test the idea we discussed above, in which formative biologi-
cal elements produce a reflective g, we took two broad-brush
measures of the biological contribution to intelligence: intracra-
nial volume (ICV) and a polygenic profile score for educational
attainment created from summary data from a recent Genome-
Wide Association Study (GWAS; Davies et al., 2016) and mod-
eled their relation with cognitive tests. Again, this was tested in
data from the Lothian Birth Cohort 1936.
Using a method similar to Tucker-Drob (2013; see section
1.3.3.), we tested whether ICV and the polygenic score were
best modeled having common, independent, or common-plus-
independent relations with g (in this case indicated by the same
four domains of cognitive ability as used in the first empirical
test, just discussed, each created from multiple tests). For both
biological variables, the parsimonious common-plus-indepen-
dent pathways model fit better than the common pathways
model (ps < .02) and no worse than the independent pathways
model (ps > .65). We combined the models for ICV and for







Dorsolateral L .126  .123 
R .134  .127 
Inferior frontal L .089  .073
R .053 .042
Lateral orbital L .095  .084 
R .151  .130 
Medial orbital L .091  .082 
R .163  .142 
Caudal ACC L .058 .050
R .066 .066
Rostral ACC L .157  .141 
R .127  .125 
Caudal middle L .058 .050
R .066 .066
Parietal
Superior L .107  .102 
R .097  .084 
Inferior L .087  .078
R .101  .099 
Note. Variables corrected for age at scan or testing, respectively, and sex, prior to
inclusion in model. Pearson’s r reported. Association between g and fluid intelli-
gence (Gf): r D .983, p < .001. L D left; R D right; ACC D Anterior Cingulate
Cortex.
p < .05. p < .01. p < .001.







Dorsolateral L 0.083  0.081 
R 0.070 0.067
Inferior frontal L 0.075 0.067
R 0.028 0.020
Lateral orbital L 0.037 0.031
R 0.045 0.029
Medial orbital L ¡0.003 0.001
R ¡0.002 ¡0.013
Caudal ACC L 0.007 ¡0.002
R 0.018 0.015
Rostral ACC L 0.101  0.097 
R 0.059 0.059
Caudal middle L 0.007 ¡0.002
R 0.018 0.015
Parietal
Superior L 0.128  0.121 
R 0.115  0.104 
Inferior L 0.097  0.095 
R 0.131  0.129 
Note. Variables corrected for age at scan or testing, respectively, and sex, prior to
inclusion in model. Associations are Pearson’s r. Association between g and fluid
intelligence (Gf): rD .983, p< .001. LD left; RD right; ACCD Anterior Cingulate
Cortex.
p < .05. p < .01. p < .001.
Figure 2. Combined common-plus-independent pathways model of the associa-
tion of biological factors with g. Note. Values are standardized regression weights
with standard errors in parentheses. The dotted line indicates a nonsignificant
path.
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the polygenic score as shown in Figure 2. This model had excel-
lent fit to the data, x2(5) D 11.29, p D .046, root mean square
error of approximation D .04, comparative fit index D .99,
Tucker-Lewis index D .98). Thus, a well-fitting model could be
produced where the biological influences are on g, rather than
the specific domains alone, though there were additional
domain-specific paths as shown in the diagram. Whereas this
analysis does not directly test a prediction of process overlap
theory, it provides a small-scale example of a useful way to
think about g: formative (and in this case, uncorrelated) biolog-
ical elements giving rise to a reflective, psychometric general
intelligence.
Conclusion
We applaud Kovacs and Conway’s detailed synthesis. They
address the greatest (though still most mysterious) empirical
discovery and regularity in psychology: the positive correlations
among diverse mental tests. They combine biology, cognitive
neuroscience, and psychometrics in an attempt to understand
the positive correlations. They recognize the value of the ideas
of Thomson, a figure who has been relatively ignored and to
whom we in Edinburgh owe so much; we thank them for their
article in so far as it is a celebratory rediscovery of Thomson’s
(1916) theory, 100 years since his first throw (literally, of dice,
in his slippers) at an alternative to Spearman’s g. We trust that
our at times seemingly crotchety remarks will be taken in an
encouraging spirit: Kovacs and Conway’s ideas made us engage
our fluid and crystallized intelligence to think hard with both
some novel and more familiar materials. In many places in the
target article we wanted to ask questions and hear more from
them. Perhaps our disagreements boil down to our putting
more emphasis on what they call “z, the unique variance of g,”
than they do, and our skepticism that their cognitive processes
are “ontologically real” (whatever that apparent pleonasm
means). Now, though, because we’ve been banging on about
the importance of empirical work on the biology of g, we had
better get back to it.
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